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Abstract
Disclosure of information triggers immediate price movements, but it
mitigates price movements at a later date, when the information would
otherwise have become public. Consequently, disclosure shifts risk from
later cohorts of investors to earlier cohorts. Hence, disclosure policy
can be interpreted as a tool to “control” interim asset price movements,
and to allocate risk intertemporally. This paper shows that a policy of
partial disclosure (and, hence, of intertemporal risk sharing) can maxi-
mize, but surprisingly also minimize, the market value of the ﬁrm. Our
model also applies to a setting where a central bank chooses the quality
and frequency of the disclosure of macroeconomic information, or to the
precision of disclosure by (distressed) banks.
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pricing, intertemporal risk sharing, general equilibrium.
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The discussion about the optimal degree of disclosure is old but still controver-
sial. The recent debate, whether the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and the Euro-
pean Central Bank should announce the results of bank stress tests, attracted
much public attention. Another example is the ongoing discussion about the
costs and beneﬁts of providing earnings guidance by public companies. Af-
ter Congress passed the Safe Harbor law that protected companies from legal
liability in performance forecasts, the practice of providing forward-looking
information, such as earnings per share guidance, became routine during the
late 1990s. The number of ﬁrms providing guidance increased from 92 in 1994
to approximately 1,200 in 2001.1
These two types of disclosure, the disclosure of information about the ability of
a bank to manage a change in the future macroeconomic environment and the
ﬁrm’s voluntary forecast of next quarter’s earnings and sales, have one thing
in common. They may trigger immediate price movements, but they mitigate
price movements at a later date, when the information would otherwise have
become public. Consequently, disclosure shifts the “timing” of price changes
and thus risk from later cohorts of investors to earlier cohorts.2
In this paper we analyze whether and how the mere decision to release of
future interim information with no impact on the distribution of cash ﬂows
can change today’s market value of the ﬁrm. In the central bank example, the
interim information is the result of a stress test. How does the central bank’s
decision to release stress test information in the future aﬀect prices today? In
the case of earnings guidance, how does a ﬁrm’s decision to change the policy
of providing earnings guidance aﬀect the market value of the ﬁrm? As the
basic idea of the paper, information inﬂuences market prices, hence potential
information is equivalent to price risk. But all information is revealed sooner
or later. Consequently, an information disclosure policy can be seen as a
mechanism to control the timing of price changes and intertemporally allocate
price risk.
Our paper focuses on the following two interrelated questions. First,h o w
does the release of interim information aﬀect interim asset price movements,
and thus intertemporal risk sharing among investors? Second, how does in-
tertemporal risk sharing among diﬀerent investors aﬀect the risk premia they
1See Thomson Financial, April 2006, “Trends in Earnings Guidance,” or The Economist,
April 2006, “Decline of Earnings Guidance.”
2In a survey, 46% of companies that provide earnings guidance said that they do so in
order to try to limit stock volatility. See Deloitte Financial Executives Research Foundation,
June 2009, Earnings Guidance: The Current State of the Play.
1demand, and thus ex ante asset prices? The paper discusses which disclo-
sure policy maximizes a ﬁrm’s market value, which policies are preferred by
diﬀerent investors, and which policy is welfare-optimal.
Conventional wisdom may suggest that the announcement of a future an-
nouncement is irrelevant for today’s market price (see Ross, 1989) or maxi-
mizes the market value (see Epstein and Turnbull, 1980; Duﬃe, Schroder, and
Skiadas, 1996, 1997).3 The main result of the present paper is to show that
intertemporal risk sharing through the release of partial interim information
can actually minimize the market value of the ﬁrm if the distribution of ﬁnal
cash ﬂows exhibits a negative skewness, low variation, and if investors are not
too risk averse. In such a case, the optimal disclosure policy of the ﬁrm is no
interim ﬁnancial reporting or no earnings guidance.
In this paper we consider an economy with three dates and three types of
agents.4 At date 0, all agents have identical information about the exogenous
cash ﬂow distribution of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is realized and publicly
known at date 2. At date 0, the entrepreneur sells the whole ﬁrm to risk-
averse early (ﬁrst-cohort) investors for the price P0 and consumes the proceeds.
At date 1, early investors want to consume and sell their shares to equally
risk-averse late (second-cohort) investors for a price P1.A t d a t e 2 , t h e c a s h
ﬂow is realized and late investors consume. Asset prices are determined in
a competitive market. At any date, there is symmetric information between
agents who trade with each other.
As mentioned above, for a given cash ﬂow process, an interim disclosure policy
can be used as a mechanism to control interim price movements (i.e., the set
of possible prices P1 at date 1), and ﬁne-tune multi-period risk sharing among
investors, which aﬀects the risk premia that diﬀerent cohorts of investors de-
mand, and thus the market value of the ﬁrm. If no interim information is
released, then early investors face no risk at all, and late investors bear the
full risk. If vice versa perfect information is released in date 0.5, then early
investors bear all the risk.
We show that intertemporal risk sharing through the release of partial interim
information can actually minimize the market value of the ﬁrm if the distri-
bution of ﬁnal cash ﬂows exhibits a negative skewness, low variation, and if
investors are not too risk averse. Intuitively, for a value-minimizing disclo-
sure policy, the “sum” of the risk premia the two cohorts of investors demand
is higher than the risk premium that one cohort of investors demands when
3We thoroughly relate our paper to the literature in the next section.
4In order to highlight the interplay between the disclosure of interim information, interim
price movements, intertemporal risk sharing, and asset pricing, this paper frames the analysis
within a ﬁnancial reporting context.
2it bears all the risk. Because of investors’ risk aversion, the ﬁrm’s market
value is inﬂuenced relatively little by large potential upward price movements.
Hence, the ﬁrm chooses a disclosure policy that avoids pronounced upward
movements.
If interim disclosure increases ﬁrm value, then ﬁrms will implement a policy
of partial disclosure. We can hence deduce empirical predictions. Innovative
ﬁrms (right skewness of the cash ﬂow distribution) should commit to release
more information, especially if investors are rather risk averse (or ownership is
concentrated), or if the dispersion of cash ﬂows is large. In each of these cases,
the potential value increase is large, hence the ﬁrm must choose partial disclo-
sure in order not to attain the complete value increase at one go. Otherwise,
due to investors’ risk aversion, this value increase would turn out small.
This paper also analyzes the preferences of the two investor cohorts for disclo-
sure of interim information. In a competitive market, investors earn rents for
bearing risk. Analogous to the standard demand and supply model, the more
risk the investor has to bear, the higher the rents, i.e., the area between de-
mand (marginal willingness to pay) and price curve becomes larger. Although
investors are risk averse, they like bearing risk ex ante since bearing risk in a
competitive ﬁnancial market means earning higher rents. Consequently, early
investors prefer full interim disclosure at date 0.5, while late investors want
the ﬁrm not to disclose any interim information.
The potential divergence of interests becomes evident in a case that has at-
tracted much public attention: the dispute between Deutsche Boerse AG and
Porsche AG concerning quarterly reports. After Porsche had refuted to switch
from half-year reporting to quarterly reporting, Deutsche Boerse removed the
carmaker from the German midcap MDAX index. The chronology of this con-
troversial debate is summarized in appendix B, highlighting diﬀerent types of
conﬂicts of interests as well as several crucial issues regarding the costs and
beneﬁts of more frequent and more precise earnings reporting by ﬁrms.
Our analysis is framed within a ﬁnancial reporting setting, but the mecha-
nism, the intuitions, and the implications are relevant whenever intertemporal
risk sharing is an issue. For example, one can analyze the optimal precision
and timing of rating changes, both from the viewpoint of rating agencies and
investors. Similarly, central bank or treasury department may decide on how
often to release interim macroeconomic information, such as inﬂation rates,
unemployment rates, or growth forecasts. The release of macroeconomic infor-
mation typically triggers price movements at the announcement day. Potential
price movements aﬀect intertemporal risk sharing between diﬀerent investor
cohorts and thus the market risk premia they demand. Since investors are
rational and forward looking, the anticipation of potential interim price move-
ments aﬀect the ex ante market value of the aggregate stock market. Similar
3questions arise. How does a given disclosure policy of the central bank aﬀect
the allocation of systematic risk that diﬀerent cohorts of investors (current
investors and future investors) have to bear? How are current and future mar-
ket prices aﬀected? And what is the optimal disclosure policy in order to to
maximize the joint payoﬀs to diﬀerent investors cohorts?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates this
paper to the literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Then in Section 4, the
competitive equilibrium is discussed, ﬁrst for a one-period model, then for the
two-period model. Section 5 discusses some applications, and derives testable
hypotheses. Section 6 gives a welfare analysis and discusses the interests of
the cohorts of investors. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix,
and so is the time line of the Porsche case.
2 Relation to the Literature
The literature on information disclosure in ﬁnancial markets is large and multi-
faceted. In a seminal paper, Ross (1989) employs the no-arbitrage martingale
approach and establishes a Resolution Irrelevancy Theorem which states that,
in an arbitrage-free economy, a mere change of the timing of the uncertainty
resolution cannot change current prices, unless the cash ﬂow distribution is al-
tered. Epstein and Turnbull (1980) show that in a setting where investors trade
and consume in multi-periods, the disclosure of interim information allows for
better consumption and trading choices. They show that partial disclosure
always maximizes the ex ante market value of the ﬁrm. Duﬃe, Schroder, and
Skiadas (1996, 1997) analyze the implications of disclosure of interim infor-
mation when traders have recursive utilities, and show that noisy disclosure
always maximizes the ex ante market value.
In contrast to these papers where interim information disclosure is either irrel-
evant or always maximizes the value of the ﬁrm, we show that the disclosure
of partial interim information may actually minimize the ex ante market value
of the ﬁrm despite intertemporal risk sharing. Furthermore, this paper give
conditions when a prescribe disclosure policy of interim information minimizes
and maximizes the ex ante market value of the ﬁrm and when it is irrelevant.
The reason for these diﬀerent results is the following. Ross (1989), Epstein
and Turnbull (1980), and Duﬃe, Schroder, and Skiadas (1996, 1997), assume
long-lived investors, while this papera s s u m e st h a ts o m ei n v e s t o r sl e a v et h e
market so that they only care about prices in some sub-periods of the whole
trading setting. A motivation for this type of overlapping generation model
structure is liquidity shocks put forward by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), or
many market microstructure models. Some investors exhibit interim liquidity
4shocks and have to sell their asset holding. In such a setting, the expected
release of information may depress stock prices because investors anticipate
they may be forced to sell after a negative announcement.
A second story the heterogeneity of investors’ trading horizons goes as fol-
lows. In the real world, portfolio managers are typically oﬀered relatively high
powered incentives schemes, and their performance is evaluated relatively fre-
quently, which induces a kind of endogenous short horizon trading behavior.
In contrast to Epstein and Turnbull (1980) and Duﬃe and Manso (2007), the
present paper assumes heterogeneous investors along the time dimension, and
is thus able to discuss potential conﬂicts of interests between investor cohorts.
In their papers, all investors have the same preference for interim disclosure
policy. Therefore, this paper may provide some intuitions for understanding
the controversial debate between Porsche and Frankfurt Stock Exchange and
the various types of conﬂicts of interests.
There is also a huge accounting literature on ﬁnancial reporting (for a survey
see Verrechia, 2001). A main focus of this literature is that ﬁnancial reporting
may serve as a tool to mitigate and resolve agency problems due to asymmetric
information. In contrast, the present paper abstracts away from any type of
agency problems and analyzes ﬁnancial reporting as a tool to control interim
price movements and intertemporal risk sharing so as to maximize the ex ante
value of the ﬁrm. As pointed out, the mechanism, intuitions and implications
this paper discusses also applies to information release and intertemporal risk
sharing in a macroeconomic environment. In particular, the release of macro-
economic information represents systematic risk and has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on
market pricing.
In our model, investors invest only for one period. In this respect, our model
resembles the work of Spiegel (1998), or more recently Watanabe (2008); Sagi,
Spiegel, and Watanabe (2009); Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2010). There is also
a recent literature on endogenous short investment horizons of funds managers.
This literature shows that ﬁnancial contracting may induce rational managers
to behave like myopic agents. They only care about the next period payoﬀs or
ﬁscal or even quarterly trading performances. The Porsche case showed that,
in addition to the Deutsche B¨ orse, it was some institutional investors who
propagated for changes of Porsche’s disclosure policy. The trading setting of
the present paper is similar to Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). Other papers on
ﬁnancial markets with myopic traders are Tirole (1982) and Cespa and Vives
(2008). In Shin (2006), managers and investors have asymmetric information.
53T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider an entrepreneur (initial owner) who wants to sell his ﬁrm at date
t = 0. The ﬁrm’s only asset is a project that matures in t = 2 and yields YH
with probability q, otherwise it yields YL <Y H.
There is a continuum of risk-averse investors, each endowed with w units of
a homogenous consumption-investment good. A ﬁrst cohort (early investors)
of mass 1 lives from period 0 to period 1, another cohort (late investors) of
mass one lives from 1 to 2. As a consequence, an early investor who buys a
share of the ﬁrm at date t = 0 will have to sell it at t = 1, without directly
proﬁting from the yields. A late investor who buys the share at t =1c a nt h e n
wait until t = 2 for the ﬁrm’s yield. In order to abstract from wealth eﬀects of
investors, let us assume that investors exhibit constant absolute risk aversion,
hence u(c)=−e−ρc. As an alternative to the risky asset, investors can invest
into a risk-free asset at rate r. The stock market is competitive. The timing
of the model is given in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of the Model
0 An initial owner commits to a disclosure policy θ, then sells shares on a
competitive market to early investors.
1
2 The ﬁrm learns the outcome Y , releases a (possibly noisy) signal about
Y with precision θ.
1 Early investors sell their shares to late investors on a competitive market;
then they consume.
2 Late investors receive the payment Y from the ﬁrm; then they consume.
The initial owner tries to maximize ﬁrm value by implementing a disclosure
policy θ. Here, θ is the precision of a signal s ∈{ L,H} on ﬁnal output
Y ∈{ YL,Y H}, disclosed before the market between early and late investors
takes place. To be concrete, Pr{s = H|Y = YH} =( θ +1 ) /2a n dP r {s =
L|Y = YL} =( θ +1 ) /2. Consequently, there is perfect disclosure for θ =1 ,
and zero disclosure for θ = 0. The signal s can be seen as a garbling of the
original information (see e.g. Baglioni and Cherubini, 2007; Weber and Croson,
2004). Trade will be inﬂuenced by the signal; a good signal will lead to a price
increase, and the price reaction will be larger if the signal is rather precise.
The initial price P0 cannot depend on the signal s itself, but it may depend
on the signal’s precision θ. The initial owner is assumed to install a policy θ
that maximizes P0.
6Since the focus is on the implications of disclosure of interim information for
interim price movements, intertemporal risk sharing, and ex ante asset pricing,
this paper abstracts away from any type of agency problems due to asymmetric
information. Therefore, this paper assumes that the cash ﬂow distribution is
common knowledge at date 0, and the entrepreneur sells the whole ﬁrm at date
0, so that his commitment to announce the pre-speciﬁed interim information
is credible. At any dates, there is symmetric information between agents who
trade with each other. Similarly, if the ﬁrm does not receive perfect interim
information, this will only make the updating slightly more complicated but
does not alter the main qualitative results of the paper.
4 Equilibrium
Let us ﬁrst solve the model with only one generation of investors. The case of
two generations and an interim signal will then be a straightforward general-
ization of these ﬁrst results.
4.1 The One-Period Case
Consider the market for an asset that pays YH with probability q, and otherwise
YL. At a market price P, the expected utility for an investor who buys α units










−(1+r)(w−αP)−αY H − (1 − q)e
−(1+r)(w−αP)−αY L. (1)
In equilibrium, investors must be indiﬀerent with respect to buying an addi-
tional marginal share, ∂u(P,α)/∂α = 0. Furthermore, the market must clear;
the entire shares must be distributed between investors. Because all investors
are identical, a representative investor must hold one share in equilibrium. As
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qY H e−ρY H +( 1− q)YL e−ρY L
qe −ρY H +( 1− q)e−ρY L (2)
The market is free of arbitrage; the good event has the risk neutral probability




qe ρY L +( 1− q)eρY H , (3)
7depending on ρ, YH and YL. If risk aversion is large, P = YL, hence only the
bad outcome YL is taken into account because eρY H   eρY L. If risk aversion is
low, then P ≈ qY H +( 1− q)YL equals the expected value. Given that (2) is
central to our model, let us discuss some elementary properties.
Lemma 1 Ceteris paribus,
• a higher interest rate r decreases the price P,
• a higher success probability q increases the price P,
• a higher risk aversion ρ decreases the price P,
• a higher low yield YL increases the price P,
• a higher high yield YH increases the price P up to some maximum.
The ﬁrst four properties are not surprising. However, the ﬁfth item states
that the market price P does not increase monotonically with the good-state
return YH. In other words, the asset market does not honor large potential
increases in value.5 The reason is simply that not the actual expected utility
from a share, but its marginal expected utility determines the market price of
an asset. The marginal utility from a payment YH decreases as YH increases.
Consequently, the market price may even decrease as YH increases. Let us thus
stress that the beneﬁt of initial owners from large potential price increases is
limited.
This property will later help to understand why the optimal disclosure strategy
may be noisy. If the signal is precise (or extremely imprecise), too much
information is revealed at a single date. The ensuing value increase is not
honored by the market, such that the initial owner does not fully beneﬁt.
The interest rate r appears only as a discount factor 1/(1+r), hence it cannot
inﬂuence the optimal disclosure policy. As a result, we can set r := 0 without
loss of generality in the following.
5This property is not a consequence of exponential utility, it holds for more general types
of utility functions, such as CRRA functions. We show this at the end of the proof of
lemma 1. Of course, it cannot hold for risk neutrality.
84.2 The Two-Periods Case
We now solve the full model, using backward induction. We will ﬁrst use
Bayes’ rule to determine the probability Pr{s = H} that a good interim signal
occurs, and the probabilities Pr{Y = YH|s = H} and Pr{Y = YH|s = L}
that the yield is high after a good or bad signal. We can then determine the
possible prices P1 ∈{ PL,P H} on the asset market at date t = 1, depending
on whether the signal was good (s = H)o rb a d( s = L). We then proceed to
period 0. The initial price P0 will then depend on the expected intermediate
prices PH and PL.
The ex ante probability that a positive signal s = H occurs is
Pr{s = H} = q Pr{s = H|Y = YH}
+( 1− q)P r {s = H|Y = YL} =
1+( 2q − 1)θ
2
.
After a positive signal s = H, Bayes’ rule can be used to receive the probability
that the return will be high,
Pr{Y = YH|s = H} =






For θ =0 ,w eg e tP r {Y = YH|s = H} = q; the signal contains no information.
For θ = 1, we receive Pr{Y = YH|s = H} = 1. Along the same line,
Pr{Y = YH|s = L} =




1 − θ(2q − 1)
.
We can now calculate the prices P1 at date t = 1, depending on whether
the public signal is positive or negative. If it is positive, the probability of
success increases to Pr{Y = YH|s = H}, which we can substitute into (2) and
get PH ≡ P1(s = H), the price of the security after the high signal. For a
negative signal, we must substitute Pr{Y = YH|s = L} into (2) and receive
PL ≡ P1(s = L). As a consequence, depending on the signal, the price of the
security moves up or down. After positive information, the price jumps up.
These potential price movements determine the risk that early investors must
bear. Again using (2), we ﬁnd that the price at date t = 0 will be
P0 =
Pr{s = H}PH e−ρP H +P r {s = L}PL e−ρP L
Pr{s = H}e−ρP H +P r {s = L}e−ρP L . (4)
9Hence, using backward induction, and using the probabilities of upward and
downward movements, one can recursively establish the prices at each date.
P0 is then the issue price at date 0. The initial owner will try and choose a
disclosure policy θ such that P0 is maximized.
Consider a numerical example with YH =1 ,YL =0 ,q = 50%, ρ =2 ,a n d
θ = 25%. The same numbers will be used in all graphical illustrations. We
obtain Pr{s = H} = 50%, Pr{Y = YH|s = H} =6 2 .5%, and Pr{Y =
YH|s = L} =3 7 .5%. Using backward induction, one can calculate the price
after a good signal as PH =0 .184, the price after a bad signal as PL =
0.075, and the initial price as P0 =0 .124. According to (3), risk neutral
probabilities are 44.6% for a good signal, 18.4% for a good outcome after a
good signal, and 7.5% for a good outcome after a bad signal. Due to the
high degree of risk aversion, risk neutral probabilities diﬀer substantially from
actual probabilities. Now there is an alternative way to calculate the initial
price, (44.6% · 18.4% + (1 − 44.6%) · 7.5%) · 1=0 .124 = P0. No arbitrage is
possible, the standard instrumentarium of arbitrage pricing can be used.
No what is the degree of disclosure θ that maximizes the issue price P0? Unlike
Ross (1989), we do not ﬁnd a general resolution irrelevance theorem; however
we get resolution irrelevance at the extreme points θ = 0 (no disclosure) and
θ = 1 (perfect disclosure).
Lemma 2 (Resolution Irrelevance at the Extremes) T h ei s s u ep r i c ei s
the same for zero disclosure and for full disclosure, P0(θ =0 )=P0(θ =1 ) .
The intuition for this lemma is straightforward. If the interim signal is perfect,
θ = 1, late investors will perfectly know the ﬁnal outcome. Consequently,
prices will be either PH = YH or PL = YL. The probability of a high signal
will be q, that of a bad signal will be 1 − q. Hence, all risk is borne by
the early investors. If the interim signal carries no information, θ =0 ,t h e n
nothing is learned by investors before the market in t =1 ,a n dPH = PL = P0.
Hence, all risk is borne by the late investors. In both cases, one cohort bears
the complete risk, the other just uses the shares as a risk-free investment.
“Swapping” cohorts does not inﬂuence the initial price P0.6
Full disclosure and no disclosure yields the same initial price P0.B u t w h a t
happens in between? In ﬁgure 2, the function P0(θ) is plotted for two diﬀerent
parameter constellations. In the left graphic, parameters are YH =1 ,Y L =
0,ρ=2 ,q= 50%. In the right graphic, parameters are the same, only
6Note that this result depends crucially on the assumption that risk aversion and the
number of investors are the same in both cohorts. Otherwise, the price would be higher if
risk were shifted to the less risk averse cohort, or to the larger cohort.
10Figure 2: Eﬀect of Disclosure Policy θ on the Initial Price P0

















q = 90%. Just from looking at these examples, we get a couple of results.
First, there is no resolution irrelevancy in general. Both pictures document
the fact that P0(θ =0 )=P0(θ = 1), but in between the functions are non-
constant. Second, there can be an interior maximum (left picture). This would
imply that the initial owner would choose to release some information to the
market, but only vague information. Third, it is also possible that partial
information is suboptimal (right picture). In this case, the initial owner would
be indiﬀerent between no disclosure (θ = 0) and full disclosure (θ = 1), but
avoid the release of imprecise interim information.
The most important question is now under which conditions an entrepreneur
chooses to implement a partial disclosure strategy, and when he prefers θ =0
or θ = 1 (zero or full disclosure). Before answering this question, let us simplify
the problem by setting YL ≡ 0a n dYH ≡ 1. The following lemma tells us that
we do not lose any generality.
Lemma 3 (Symmetry Results) The following two statements hold true,
P0(YH,Y L,ρ,q,θ)=P0(YH − YL,0,ρ,q,θ)+YL and
P0(YH,0,ρ,q,θ)=YH P0(1,0,ρY H,q,θ).
The ﬁrst statements tells us that if we increase both YH and YL by the
same amount, the market price increase by exactly this amount. As a con-
sequence, without loss of generality we can consider P0(ΔY,0,ρ,q,θ)i n s t e a d
of P0(YH,Y L,ρ,q,θ), with ΔY = YH − YL. The second statements tells us
the multiplying YH with some constant has the same eﬀect on market prices
as multiplying ρ with the same constant and multiplying the price with the
same constant. As a consequence, we can consider P0(1,0,ρΔY,q,θ)i n s t e a d
of P0(ΔY,0,ρ,q,θ). Without loss of generality, we can even set ΔY ≡ 1,
bearing in mind that an increase in variation ΔY has the same eﬀect as an
increase in risk aversion ρ. Now, only two exogenous parameters are left in
11the model, ρ = ρΔY and q. The following proposition states their inﬂuence
on the optimal disclosure policy.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Disclosure Policy) The function P0(θ) has an
interior maximum θ∗ if
q<
eρ (eρ − ρ − 1)
(eρ − 1)2 . (5)
Because the function P0(θ) is not constant, if it does not have an inner maxi-
mum, it must exhibit an inner minimum. Hence, sharing ﬁnancial risk between
cohorts can increase the market valuation P0, but it does not have to. Intertem-
poral risk sharing is thus fundamentally diﬀerent from static risk sharing. The
aggregate risk premium may be minimized if all risk is shifted to one cohort.
The proposition is illustrated by ﬁgure 3. For large q or for low ρ, we end up
in the gray region where the initial owner chooses zero (or full) disclosure. For
small q or for high ρ, the initial owner chooses noisy disclosure in the white
region. The black curve marks critical parameter combinations, as deﬁned by
(5). Let us give some intuition why there may be an interior optimum in the
ﬁrst place, and how q and ρ inﬂuence this property.
Figure 3: Optimal Disclosure Policy










Parameters are YH =1a n dYL = 0. However, because of lemma 3, ρand q represent the
complete parameter space without loss of generality. The black curve gives condition (5), so
that above this curve, the function P0(θ) has an interior minimum; below the curve, P0(θ)
has an interior maximum.
If q is low or ρ is high, the initial price P0 lies relatively low in the range
[YL; YH]. From the fourth point of lemma 1, we know that the initial owner
beneﬁts from value increases for the investors only up to some point. Therefore,
the initial owner designs the disclosure policy to avoid large upward price
jumps; he chooses partial disclosure, 0 <θ<1. As a result, risk is distributed
evenly between cohorts.
12The intuition for the possibility of an interior minimum is slightly more in-
volved. Because the signal s is garbled for 0 <θ<1, it is always misleading
with positive probability. The signal can be negative although the ﬁnal yield
is high. Especially for a relatively high initial price P0 (hence, for large q or
low ρ), a negative signal can entail a steep price drop, with the possibility of a
rebound in the second period, a rebound that overcompensates the initial price
drop. At this point, remember that the initial owner does not beneﬁt from
large price increases. Consequently, he will avoid the price drop and rebound
altogether, for example by setting θ = 0. This argument explains why the
function P0(θ) has an interior maximum for high ρ or low q, and it exhibits a
minimum in the opposite case.
We have assumed that the initial owner can choose θ within the interval [0; 1].
In reality, there may be reasons why this interval is trimmed. First, information
may leak out of the ﬁrm at the interim date. Investors will then aggregate this
information and the disclosed signal precision θ to a new signal. This signal
will then have some minimum precision θmin, equal to the quality of the leaking
information. If the price function has an interior minimum (see ﬁgure 3), the
maximum is reached for full disclosure, θ∗ =1 . Second, the ﬁnal outcome
Y may not be predictable with certainty, entailing a maximum precision θmax.
The precision can be reduced by additional garbling, but it cannot be increased.
Then if the price function has an interior minimum, the maximum is reached
for zero disclosure, θ∗ = 0. These insights may help explain why ﬁrms stopped
to publish earnings forecasts in the ﬁnancial crisis. Our model implies that, if
the future becomes less predictable and the maximum precision θmax is reduced,
ﬁrms switch to zero disclosure (instead of just reducing disclosure).
Figure 4: Optimal Level of Disclosure















Parameters are YH =1a n dYL = 0, as before.
Figure 4 shows the optimal level of disclosure for varying q and ρ. Again,
we have set YL =0a n dYH = 1 without loss of generality (see lemma 3).
There are a number of properties to be seen. First, in the gray region, either
θ =0o rθ = 1 is optimal. In the white region, the optimal θ increases in
13ρ and decreases in q. Consequently, assuming that the initial owner opts for
θ = 0 when indiﬀerent (in the gray region), we see that the optimal degree
of disclosure increases in ρ and decreases in q. Second, the optimal level of
disclosure approaches 1 as q goes to zero, or ρ becomes extremely large. Third,
at the implicit function deﬁned by (5), there is a discontinuity in the optimal
θ. From a strictly positive θ in the white region, θ drops to zero in the gray
region. Indeed, the minimal possible θ t h a tc a nb eo b t a i n e da sa ni n t e r i o r
optimum is θ =1 /
√
2 ≈ 0.71, at the point (q =0 .5,ρ≈ 0). Hence, the initial
owner never ﬁnds it optimal to disclose very vague information. If he chooses
to disclose at all, there is a minimum level of precision with θ =1 /
√
2.
5 Applications and Hypotheses
In this section, we apply the model to a number of questions, and derive
testable hypotheses. Some applications are immediate consequences of the
model, for others we have to modify the assumptions.
5.1 The Shape of the Distribution
Stochastic Moments. We have seen that the optimal disclosure policy de-
pends on the success probability q and risk aversion ρ,w h e r eρ is short for
ρ(YH − YL) because we have set YH =1a n dYL = 0 without loss of gener-
ality. So, both parameters q and ρ are connected to the shape of the distri-
bution. Thus, for easier interpretation, let us rewrite results in dependence
from stochastic moments. First of all, the ﬁrst statement of lemma 3 states
that increasing both YH and YL b yt h es a m ea m o u n tc only shifts the complete
function P0(θ) upwards by c. The shape of the function does not chance, hence
the optimal θ remains constant. As a consequence, the optimal disclosure pol-
icy does not depend on the mean of the yield distribution.
Second, ρ appears only in the factor ρ(YH − YL). Instead of setting YH =1
and YL =0 ,l e tu ss e tρ =1a n dYL = 0 without loss of generality, being left
with the two parameters YH and q. Now the second stochastic moment σ and
the third moment ν of the distribution are functions of YH and ρ,
μ = qY H +( 1− q)Y0 = qY H,
σ =

q(YH − μ)2 +( 1− q)μ2,
ν =
q(YH − μ)3 − (1 − q)μ3
σ3/2 .
14Reversely, one can write q and YH as implicit functions of the standard devi-












We can now plot the optimal level of disclosure depending on the standard
deviation σ and skewness ν (ﬁgure 5), and get the following remark.
Remark 1 The mean of the yield distribution does not inﬂuence the optimal
disclosure policy. Both higher standard deviation σ and a higher skewness
imply a higher optimal level of disclosure.
Figure 5: Optimal Disclosure Policy














Parameters are YH =1a n dYL = 0, as before. For comparability with ﬁgure 4, we use −ν
instead of ν as the ordinate.
Note that σ and ν are stochastic moments of the yield Y , not of the probabil-
ity distribution of prices P1 (which is endogenous). Arguably, both risk and
skewness are higher in innovative industrial sectors. Projects are likely to fail,
but if they do not fail, they can deliver high returns, the distribution is typi-
cally skewed to the right (positive skewness). Consequently, the above remark
implies that a high level of disclosure. For more traditional industries, risk is
relatively small and the distribution is skewed more to the left. Consequently,
the remark predicts less disclosure, or no disclosure at all.
Autoregressive Eﬀects. In our model, the distribution of risk over time
is endogenous. We can thus ask whether the implied patterns are consistent
with stylized facts. For example, after a price drop of an asset, the volatility
of price movements typically increases. In order to apply our model to this
question, let us assume that before period 0, there is a piece of information
15that deﬁnes q; the rest of the model processes as before. Possibly, the ﬁrm
can react to a downward movement (low q) by disclosing more information,
thus moving risk from the far future (second period in the original timing) do
the near future (ﬁrst period). If this is the case, we would observe exactly the
autoregressive pattern of the stylized fact.
Now looking at ﬁgure 4, this is exactly the case. Assume that the initial owner
decides upon disclosure after ﬁnding out that q is high (hence, after an upward
price movement). If q is high enough to land in the gray region, there will be
zero disclosure. Hence, there will be no price movements in period 1, and a
large movement in period 2. If, on the other hand, q is in the white region
in ﬁgure 4, the lower q is, the higher the precision of disclosure. Expected
price movements will be large in the ﬁrst period, and smaller in the second. In
line with the stylized facts, our model suggests that volatility should be higher
after a price drop, and small after a price increase.
5.2 Concentration of Ownership
Up to now, shares were assumed to be evenly distributed between investors.
Now assume that, for some exogenous reason, only a fraction n<1 of investors
can buy shares. The remaining fraction 1−n has no inﬂuence on asset prices.
Thus 1/n stands for the concentration of ownership. In the formal analysis,
marginal utility from buying another share must still be zero, but each investor




qY H e−ρ/nYH +( 1− q)YLe−ρ/nYL
qe −ρ/nYH +( 1− q)e−ρ/nYL . (6)
Hence, ρ measures both risk aversion and ownership concentration. Therefore,
any result concerning risk aversion becomes a statement on ownership concen-
tration. For example, for low ownership concentration, zero disclosure may be
optimal. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher the optimal level of
disclosure.
Possibly, ownership concentration can change over time. For example, the
ﬁrm may ﬁrst be held by a small number of large investors (such as investment
banks) who then gradually sell, such that assets are widely held in the end. In
this case, ownership concentration decreases over time, which corresponds to
decreasing risk aversion over time, ρ2 <ρ 1. This has a number of consequences.
First, lemma 2 no longer holds, P0(θ =0 )>P 0(θ = 1). The argument is
straightforward. Because ownership concentration is smaller in the second
period, the risk premium for late investors is smaller. Therefore, c.p., shifting
risk to late investors reduces the aggregate risk premium, and increases the
16initial price P0. Now the fact that a low level of disclosure θ reduces risk for
early investors and increases risk for late investors completes the argument.
With the same procedure as in the proof of proposition 1, we arrive at the
following remark.
Remark 2 The function P0(θ) has an interior maximum if
q<
eρ2 (eρ2 − ρ1 − 1)
(eρ2 − 1)2 . (7)
For ρ2 <ρ 1, the critical q is smaller than that for identical ownership con-
centration in both periods. The range of parameters where zero disclosure is
optimal becomes larger. Summing up, if ownership concentration decreases
over time, the optimal degree of disclosure decreases. For ρ2 >ρ 1, a reverse
argument applies.
5.3 Market Liquidity
In the model, all early investors have to sell at date 1, implying that the
complete market is turned over in one period. By assuming that only a fraction
of investors needs to sell at date 1, we can reduce the turnover (liquidity). Such
a reduced liquidity will have a couple of consequences. Clearly, because some
investors hold the asset for both periods, the importance of intertemporal risk
sharing will decrease, and the impact of disclosure levels on share prices will
decline. The optimal level of disclosure itself may also change, but the direction
in unclear a priori.
Let us now assume that, at date 1, only a fraction λ ≤ 1 must leave the market
(potentially due to a stochastic liquidity shock), but another mass λ enters the
market. Hence, the aggregate mass of investors is 1 at each date. Now λ is
a measure for market turnover, or liquidity. For λ = 0, there is no interim
trading, and disclosure policy is irrelevant. For λ = 1, the complete volume is
traded at t = 1, and we have our original model.
Prices are determined only by future payoﬀ expectations, they are independent
of whether investors have held the asset in the preceding period or not. Conse-
quently, interim prices at date t = 1 are independent of liquidity λ. PH and PL
are not inﬂuenced by whether an asset has been held or traded, hence PH and
PL are independent of λ. However, the initial price P0 will be inﬂuenced by λ.
When making investment decisions, investors take into account that they will
hold the asset until t = 2 with probability 1 − λ, and get payoﬀs of YH and
YL with the according probabilities, or only hold the asset until t =1w i t h
17probability λ, and get payoﬀs of PH and PL with the according probabilities.
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.
In the competitive market equilibrium, ∂u(P0,α)/∂α = 0 must hold, and the
market must clear, α = 1. This again yields an implicit function P0(θ), which
may exhibit an interior maximum or minimum. We have already discussed the
extreme case of a perfectly liquid market, λ = 1. For illustration, consider the
other extreme of an illiquid market, λ → 0.7
The left part of ﬁgure 6 shows the optimal levels of disclosure for λ → 0. For
comparison, the right part shows the optimal levels both for λ → 0( d a s h e d )
and λ = 1 (solid, as in ﬁgure 4). Two properties are important. First,t h e
function P0(θ) has an interior minimum for zero liquidity (λ = 0) whenever it
has an interior minimum for full liquidity (λ = 1). Hence, the answer to the
question whether partial disclosure is optimal does not depend on the degree
of liquidity. Second, if partial disclosure is optimal, the optimal precision θ∗
depends positively on liquidity, dθ∗/dλ > 0.
Remark 3 The question whether partial disclosure is optimal is independent
o ft h ed e g r e el i q u i d i t yλ. If partial disclosure is optimal, the optimal level θ∗ is
larger for higher degrees of liquidity, dθ∗/dλ > 0.
6 The Investors’ Interests – Welfare
The initial owner of the ﬁrm aims at maximizing the issue price P0.U p t o
now, we have hence implicitly taken the initial owner’s perspective. However,
the investors may not be indiﬀerent with respect to the allocation of risk over
time. They are, of course, indiﬀerent with respect to buying one more marginal
share at the given price, but this does not imply that they do not earn any
rents. If information were perfect and the ﬁnal payoﬀ Y were known, an
investor’s demand function would be ﬂat, hence his rent would be zero. With
uncertainty, demand for shares is elastic, and thus rents will be positive. The
7The boundary case with λ = 0 cannot be discussed, because no shares are traded and
disclosure is thus irrelevant. However, in the limit λ → 0, the optimal disclosure policy
converges (although the impact of disclosure becomes vanishingly small).
18Figure 6: Optimal Disclosure Policy in an Illiquid Market






















The left picture shows the optimal levels of disclosure θ∗ (as iso-optimal-degree-of-disclosure
curves) for the limiting case of zero liquidity, λ → 0. Now compare this ﬁgure to ﬁgure 4
(where all early investors had to sell at date t = 1, hence λ = 1). The two pictures looks
similar at ﬁrst glance; the border between zero disclosure and partial disclosure is identical,
but the iso-θ∗-curves are shifted towards higher ρ (or, equivalently, smaller q). This becomes
visible by superimposing the two ﬁgures (right picture, with dashed curves for λ =0a n d
solid curves for λ = 1). For small degrees of risk aversion, the curves are nearly identical,
but for larger ρ, the diﬀerence becomes more pronounced. In comparison, the optimal θ is
higher for larger liquidity λ.
higher the risk for a cohort, the higher the rents that this cohort will earn. As
a consequence, from an ex ante perspective, each cohort will want to bear as
much risk as possible. Early investors would like to implement full disclosure
(θ = 1), which would move the complete risk to themselves. Late investors
prefer θ =0 .
Lemma 4 (Extreme Diversion of Interests) From an ex ante perspective,
early investors ﬁnd θ =1(full disclosure) optimal, the second cohort prefers
θ =0(zero disclosure). From an ex interim perspective, preference orderings
are reversed.
Investors like risk ex ante because it enables them to pay a low price for the
issue. Consequently, their attitude changes as soon as they have bought the
issue: early investors will prefer not to have any information revealed while
they own the shares. The same holds true for late investors.
The lemma suggests that, if disclosure standards were determined in a political
process, the result would heavily be inﬂuenced by the timing of the decision
(and by the proportion between cohorts of investors). Each cohort would lobby
towards vague disclosure once they held shares; beforehand, they would argue
they want to have access to information as soon as it is available.8
8Note that these preferences refer to complete cohorts of investors. Individually, each
investor wants as much information as possible before trading. Cohort-wise, investors want
to be uninformed before trading.
19Figure 7: The Investors’ Expected Utility




















Like in ﬁgure 2, q = 50% in the left picture, and q = 90% in the right.
Let us deﬁne (investor) welfare as the sum of investors’ utilities, W(θ)=
U1(θ)+U2(θ).9 Figure 7 shows the expected utilities of each group of investors
as dotted lines for two numerical examples. Lemma 4 is conﬁrmed: U1 increases
with θ,w h e r e a sU2 decreases. We see that, in analogy to lemma 2, a welfare-
maximizing regulator is also indiﬀerent between zero and full disclosure, W(θ =
0) = W(θ = 1). Furthermore, the welfare function W(θ) exhibits an interior
maximum ˆ θ even for parameter constellations where the price function P0(θ)
had an interior minimum. This observation is general, as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Welfare-Optimal Disclosure) Welfare is always maximized
with partial disclosure, ˆ θ ∈ (0; 1)
The reason why there is always an interior maximum at an interior ˆ θ diﬀers
slightly from the explanation for an interior maximum of P0(θ). With a grain
of salt, a single cohort’s ex ante utility increases with the amount of risk it
takes. But due to risk aversion, the marginal utility with respect to taking more
risk is decreasing; it can even become negative. This implies that, by sharing
risk between the two cohorts, the aggregate rent of investors is maximized. A
formal discussion is in the proof of proposition 2 in the appendix.
Figure 8 shows the welfare-optimal levels ˆ θ of disclosure. Parameters are YH =
1a n dYL = 0, but remember that the ﬁgure is general because YH =1a n d
YL = 0 without loss of generality due to lemma 3. Therefore, in comparison
9There are three reasons to do so. First, our result that the welfare-optimal level of
disclosure ˆ θ exceeds the level θ∗ preferred by the initial owner will hold true if some utility
of the owner is taken into account. Second, this way, we do not need to make any assumptions
about the initial owner’s utility function. Finally, the initial owner is negligible in comparison
to a continuum of investors.
20Figure 8: Welfare-optimal Disclosure Policy































In the left picture, the curves show the welfare-optimal ˆ θ, depending on parameters ρ and q.
Partial disclosure is always welfare-optimal. In the right picture, the initial owner chooses
zero disclosure in the gray region although partial disclosure would be welfare-optimal.
Furthermore, an eyeball comparison between the ˆ θ in this ﬁgure and the θ∗ from ﬁgure 4
shows that ˆ θ>θ ∗ for all combinations of q and ρ; the welfare-optimal level of disclosure
always exceeds the level preferred by the initial owner.
with ﬁgure 4, we ﬁnd three properties. First, the initial owner may choose
zero disclosure although partial disclosure is welfare-optimal. Second, even if
the initial owner prefers partial disclosure, the welfare-optimal level ˆ θ is always
higher. Third, full disclosure is never welfare-optimal (except for the limiting
case of q → 0).
Remark 4 The welfare-optimal disclosure level ˆ θ exceeds the laissez-faire level
θ∗.
This remark has some implications for a potential regulation of disclosure. In-
dependent of external parameters, there is always scope for regulation, because
the laissez-faire level of disclosure θ∗ is below the welfare optimum. Further-
more, if the regulator imposes minimum disclosure standards, there should not
be as high as possible. More information is not better. Finally, the optimal
disclosure standard is not a ﬁxed number, but depends on exogenous parame-
ters. More risky ﬁrms should have higher disclosure standards, and so should
more innovative ﬁrms, and more closely held ﬁrms.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Introducing liquidity concerns into a disclosure model with risk averse in-
vestors, we have found a rich set of implications, even in the complete absence
of asymmetric information. The market’s appreciation for large upward value
21increases is limited, hence a ﬁrm should design its disclosure policy to avoid
large upward jumps. Therefore, if the upward potential of a stock is large, the
ﬁrm should release information gradually, and there is an optimal precision of
the disclosure information. In the opposite case, if the cash ﬂow distribution
exhibits negative skewness, i.e. if there is a low probability of a large downside
risk, a gradual release of information reduces share prices and zero disclosure
maximizes the share price instead. The prospect of intertemporal risk sharing
thus increases share prices in some cases, but not all.
This general insight can be applied in various ways. For example, consider
the stochastic moments of the underlying asset’s cash ﬂow. In a market equi-
librium, a higher mean will increase the initial price, but leave the upward
potential for investors unchanged. Consequently, we ﬁnd that the mean does
not inﬂuence optimal disclosure policy. If investors are risk averse, a large
standard deviation increases the risk premium, and hence depresses the initial
price. Consequently, the upward potential increases, rendering partial dis-
closure optimal. Finally, a positive skewness implies that price increases are
unlikely but can be large, whereas price decreases are likely but are more lim-
ited in size. Hence, for large positive skewness, partial disclosure is optimal.
On the other hand for large negative skewness, if there is no disclosure, the
market value of the ﬁrm is maximized.
In many ﬁnancial transactions, ownership concentration of stocks changes
abruptly. For example, in an IPO, concentration decreases, with consequences
on optimal intertemporal risk allocation, and hence also on disclosure pol-
icy. Because the ownership base broadens under an IPO, the later cohort of
investors can easier bear the ﬁnancial risk, hence the risk premium will be
relatively low. As a consequence, optimal disclosure will be relatively noisy.
Also the degree of liquidity of an asset inﬂuences the disclosure policy. With
less trading, the intertemporal allocation of risk plays less of a role. At the
same time, the optimal degree of disclosure decreases.
Importantly, the welfare-optimal degree of disclosure weakly exceeds the price-
maximizing degree, with two consequences. First, maximal disclosure does
not need to be optimal. This result is not surprising in our setting, as full
disclosure would imply zero intertemporal risk sharing. Second, disclosure
should be regulated; ﬁrms should be forced to disclose more than they want.
As a consequence, disclosure regulation needs to be ﬁne-tuned, and it can
diﬀer between ﬁrms or assets with diﬀerent ownership structures, diﬀerent risk
structures, diﬀerent payoﬀ proﬁles, and diﬀerent degree of liquidity.
In the light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the academic and policy debate about
information disclosure and the role of transparency especially in ﬁnancial ﬁrms
is likely to remain controversial. Our paper adds the aspects of liquidity con-
cerns and intertemporal risk sharing to this debate and delivers some new
22insights. The model implies that if the economic environment becomes less
predictable in the sense that ﬁrms get less precise signals, then it is optimal
for ﬁrms to switch to zero disclosure instead of just reducing disclosure. This
provides a rationale for the observation that during the recent ﬁnancial crises
many ﬁrms stopped providing earnings guidance.
A Appendix




ρ(YH+YL) (YH − YL)
(qe ρY L +( 1− q)eρY H)2 > 0,
dP
dρ
= −q (1 − q)e
ρ(YH+YL) (YH − YL)2




ρY H qe ρY L (1 + ρ(YH − YL)) + (1 − q)eρY H




ρY L qe ρY L +( 1− q)eρY H (1 − ρ(YH − YL))
(qe ρY L +( 1− q)eρY H)2 .
The last term is positive if and only if YH − YL <


1 + plog[e−1 q/(1 − q)]

/ρ,
where plog y is the product log, the solution of the equation y = xe x.
The property that the dP/dYH reaches a maximum at some YH is not speciﬁc
to exponential utility functions of investors. Consider constant relative risk
aversion, u(c)=c1−ρ, with ρ>1. The relative risk aversion is then ρ>1. In






=( 1− ρ)q(YH − P)(W + YH − P)
−ρ
+( 1− ρ)(1− q)(YL − P)(W + YL − P)
−ρ. (8)
If the market clears, this term (8) must be equal to zero. Due to risk aversion,
the price P cannot exceed the expected yield, P ≤ qY H +( 1− q)YL.A s a
consequence, (YH−P)(W +YH−P)−ρ → 0a sYH →∞ . However, this implies
that also (YL −P)(W +YL −P)−ρ must converge to zero for YH →∞ ,w h i c h
is only possible if P → YL. This proves that the function P(YH)c a n n o tb e
monotonic if the relative risk aversion ρ exceeds 1. 
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : If θ =0 ,t h e nP r {s = H} =1 /2, Pr{Y = YH|s =
H} = q,a n dP r {Y = YH|s = L} = q. The signal contains no information,
nothing can be learned. Consequently, PH = PL, and hence
P0 =
qY H e−ρ(YH−YL) +( 1− p)YL
qe −ρ(YH−YL) +( 1− q)
23as in (2). Now consider the second case, θ =1 . T h e nP r {s = H} = q,
Pr{Y = YH|s = H} =1 ,a n dP r {Y = YH|s = L} = 0. As a result, PH = YH
and PL = YL,a n dP0 is exactly as above. Hence, P0 is independent from
whether θ =0o rθ =1 . 
Proof of Lemma 3: The ﬁrst statement is obvious. For the second state-
m e n t ,ﬁ r s tl o o ka tt h eo n e - p e r i o dc a s e ,
P(cY H,0,ρ,q,θ)=
qcY H e−ρcY H
qe −ρY H +( 1− q)
= cP(YH,0,cρ,q,θ).
This result carries immediately through to the two-period case. 
Proof of Proposition 1: We want to distinguish between the two cases of
ﬁgure 2. Both have dP0/dθ|θ=0 = 0, this can easily be shown analytically.
Hence, to see whether the function increases or decreases around θ =0 ,c o n -








2 (1 − q)
2 eρ (2q + eρ (1 − q) − ρ − 1)
(eρ (1 − q)+q)4 .
This term is positive iﬀ (5) holds. Consequently, P0(θ) increases around θ =0 ,
but P0(1) = P0(0). Because P0(θ) is diﬀerentiable, there must be an interior
optimum. 
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 : We ﬁrst want to argue that ex ante, each cohort of
investors wants to bear as much risk as possible. Look at one cohort only, and
set W = 0 without loss of generality. Furthermore, set YH = ¯ Y +( 1− p) 
and YL = ¯ Y − p , such that the mean is always ¯ Y ,a n d  measures (lack of)
information before the trade. Then, substituting (2) into (1) with α = 1 due
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,
which is positive for  >0. As a consequence, higher risk raises utility (ex
ante). Now take the ex interim perspective, i.e., keep the price ﬁxed. Then




p +( 1− p)e
 ρ
e
(P−¯ Y )−(1−p) .
24The derivative with respect to   is now
∂u
∂ 
= ρp(1 − p)(1− e
 ρ)e
(P−¯ Y )−(1−p) ,
which is negative for  >0. Hence, higher risk decreases utility ex interim.
The argument, as it stands, applies to early and late investors. Hence ex ante,
early investors ﬁnd θ = 1 optimal; late investors like θ = 0 best. Ex interim,
preferences are reversed. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The proof is structurally similar to that of propo-
sition 1. From ﬁgure 7, we have an example where welfare is hump-shaped
in θ, it reaches its optimum for some θ∗ ∈ (0; 1). So in order to turn into
a U-shaped function, d2W(θ)/dθ2 w o u l dh a v et ov a n i s ha tθ =0f o rs o m e
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ρ (1 − q)+q)
	
.
Some algebra shows that the last bracket is positive for 0 <q<1a n dρ>0,
hence the whole derivative is positive. 
B Time Line of the Porsche Case
July 18, 2001. The talk between Deutsche Boerse and Porsche on MDAX listing fails and
decision on de-listing is due August 7. Deutsche Boerse board member Christoph Lammers-
dorf: “Porsche refuses to publish full quarterly earnings report and does not therefore fulﬁll
the MDAX membership criteria. Whoever is in an index should inform it’s shareholders
simultaneously, regularly and fully. Quarterly earnings reports increase transparency in the
capital market.”
Wendelin Wiedeking, CEO of Porsche: “We do not want to enter into short-term considera-
tion that came as a result of quarterly targets. There is a big danger that you only manage
in suchawaythatthe quarterlyﬁguresaregood(...) thatshort-termwayofthinkingis
not in my view a sensible way of running a business.”
Press Release by Porsche: Recent experience in particular has demonstrated that quarterly
reports not only lead to greater bureaucratic costs and eﬀort but, even worse, also interfere
with a company’s pursuit of its long-term growth strategies. They have not contributed to
greater transparency, as shown by the developments on the new market. As Porsche sees
it, the main eﬀort of quarterly reports is to increase the volatility on the stock market. We
feel that quarterly reports are ﬁrst and foremost a plan to drum up business for Deutsche
Boerse and the banks. We would have appreciated if the Deutsche Boerse had acknowledged
its true motives in this matter.
August 7, 2001. Deutsche Boerse announces that Porsche to be ejected from MDAX
index, eﬀective September 24.
25August 9, 2001. The German government may draft a law forcing companies to report
results every quarter.
October 11, 2001. The German government is dropping plans for law forcing publicly
traded companies to release quarterly earnings report after a disagreement within the gov-
ernment and amid criticism from some companies.
October 31, 2001. Porsche receives distinguished award for ﬁnancial market communica-
tions from “Investor Relation Magazine.”
Sources: Agence France Presse (7/18/01), AFX Europe Focus (8/7/01), Bloomberg News
(7/18/01, 8/9/01, 10/11/01), Financial Times (8/7/01), Porsche Press Release (7/18/01,
10/31/01)
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